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ESSAY 1: THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERACE AD THE
LEGTH IT TAKES TO REMOVE A POOR-PERFROMIG CEO.

Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the
length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance.
We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are
quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for
other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision.

Keywords: CEO turnover, quality of internal corporate governance, length
Firm performance, board structure
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1. Introduction
Empirical

evidence suggests that the quality of a firm’s corporate

governance impacts its decision to terminate a poor performing CEO (e.g.,
Weisbach (1988), Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Jensen
(1993), Shivdasani (1993), Ofek (1993), Denis and Denis (1994), Denis, Denis and
Sarin (1995); Mikkelson and Partch (1996), Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani
(1996), Yermack (1996), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Mikkelson and
Partch (1997)), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997); Perry (2000), Faleye (2003), Maury
(2006), Kato and Long (2006), and Conyon and He (2008)). Pursuing the same line
of research, we posit in this paper that a firm with a better quality of governance
mechanisms will likely be quicker to terminate its CEO after the initial sign of
poor firm performance. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the better the
quality of corporate governance in place, the shorter is the time taken by the firm
to get its poor-performing CEO removed.
Based on the existing literature on corporate governance, we employ, along
with some control variables, a group of proxies that reflect the quality of corporate
governance system. The proxies include fraction of outside directors on board,
board size, level of managerial ownership, levels of holdings by CEO, levels of
holdings by controlling shareholder, and the magnitude of incentive compensations
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to outside directors. We use three proxies to measure firm performance: ROA
(return on assets), ROE (return on equity), and M/B (market-to-book).
Our sample consists of S&P 500 firms in which involuntary CEO turnovers
occur from during the 2004-2011 period. We compute the length by measuring the
number of quarters it takes for such a turnover to take place subsequent to the
firm’s first poor performance during the tenure of the CEO in question. This
sample selection process might induce a bias when interpreting results as it allows
one to observe only those firms that actually fire their CEOs but not the ones that
choose not to take such an actions in spite of the poor performances. To address
this problem known as incidental truncation, we employ Heckman’s two step
procedure. The first step in this procedure is to apply a probit model to the whole
population 500 firms. The second step applies the least square estimates to the
selected sample (i.e., firms that actually remove their CEOs).
Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that a firm with a better quality of
governance is quicker to fire its poor-performing CEO. Although several studies
examine the linkage between CEO firings and good system of corporate
governance, we contribute to literature by relating corporate governance quality to
the speed at which a poor-performing CEO is removed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
pertinent literature, while Section 3 describes the sample, testing models, and
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methodology. Section 4 presents results supported by robustness checks and
Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Why do CEOs get removed?
Why do firms remove CEOs? This question has been broached by
researchers. In this paper, we present three, not necessarily mutually exclusive,
explanations in answer to the question. They are information asymmetry between
the CEO candidate and the board, sociopolitical forces, and poor firm performance.
Rijck (2011) suggests information asymmetry that exists at the time of hiring
the CEO is

a reason for firing CEOs when the asymmetry is subsequently

removed. In this construct, the board is the principal, and the potential CEO
candidate is the agent. The candidate will do everything to fit the profile for the
position and exaggerate his or her personality traits that are positive. The candidate
has the incentive to hide information that might hinder the suitability of his
candidacy. Such information, which can be highly relevant to the board for the
decision-making process, is kept from the board. The resulting information
asymmetry leads to the initial hire and, upon removal of information asymmetry,
subsequent fire of the CEO.
Fredrickson et al (1988) propose a model (figure 1) suggesting that the
board's actions can be explained by several sociopolitical forces, dealing with
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interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power. Four such forces appear critical-(a)
the board's expectations and attributions, (b) the board's allegiances and values, (c)
the availability of alternative candidates for CEO, and (d) the power of the
incumbent CEO. Therefore, the event of dismissal can be explained best by using a
combination of social and political forces, not simply by considering

Figure 1: A model of CEO dismissal
whether it is rational for the organization to remove or retain executives associated
with a given level of organizational performance. It should be emphasized that the
four sociopolitical forces, along with organizational performance, operate in a
ceteris paribus manner to affect the likelihood of dismissal. For example, the
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poorer the firm's actual performance, the greater the incumbent's power must be in
order to keep his or her job. Similarly, the stronger the board's allegiance to the
CEO, the more abundant the pool of possible replacements must be for the board to
consider dismissal, and so on. None of the forces operates alone, although one
extreme condition (e.g., high expectations of the board or a very powerful
incumbent) may create the appearance that the other forces do not matter.
The third category of explanations focuses on the sub-par firm performance
when the incumbent CEO at its helm. In the next subsection, we survey this
literature.
2.2. On the linkage between poor performing firm and dismissal of its CEO
The linkage between forced termination of CEOs and their subpar
performance has been established in several studies. , including McEachern
(1975), Salancik & Pfeffer (1980), James & Soref (1981), Coughlan and Schmidt
(1985), Brickley et al. (1988); Weisbach (1988); Warner, Watts, and Wruck
(1988), Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Denis, Denis and
Sarin (DDS) (1995); Borokhovich et al (1996); Yermack (1996); Denis, Denis and
Sarin (1997); Parrino (1997), Huson (2000) ; Perry (2000); Maury (2006); Kato
and Long (2006); Conyon and He (2008)).
Parrino (1997) document negative relation between firm performance and
the probability of forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, Coughlan and
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Schmidt (1985) and Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) provide supports by
showing that poor performance is associated with CEO turnover. These studies
discuss about the board’s effectiveness in replacing CEO following poor firm
performance; however, these studies do not explore the differences in monitoring
between the managers who serve as inside directors (full-time employees of the
company) and directors who are outside directors (not full-time employees of the
company, neither work for the corporation nor have extensive dealings with the
company).
Weibach (1988) examines how differently inside and outside directors
behave in their decisions to remove top management. By testing on 485 publicly
held corporation between 1977 and 1980, he argues that firms with outsider
dominated boards (all firms in which at least 60% of the board are outsiders are
designated outsider-dominated firms) are significantly more likely than firms with
insider dominated boards (all firms in which outsiders make up no more than 40%
of the directors are considered insider-dominated firms) to remove the CEO
following poor firm performance. His findings suggest that outside directors are
more likely than inside directors to fire CEO after poor firm performance because
successors from outside the firm are more willing to break with the failed policies
of their predecessors. He also argues that outsider-dominated boards tend to add to
firm value through their CEO changes. This addition to firm value is largest when
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the change is preceded by poor performance. Similar results are reported in Maury
(2006), Kato and Long (2006), Canyon and He (2008), Chen (2012).
The relation between firm performance and top executive is also driven by
many other factors such as board size (Yermack (1996)), ownership (Morck et al
(1988), DDS (1997), Kato and Long (2006), Conyon and He (2008)), director
compensation (Perry (2000). This relation is also affected by takeover market
which is reported in Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Hadlock and Lumer (1997).
This evidence suggests that top managers face reduced disciplinary pressure in
periods where there is less takeover activity.
The association between CEO turnover and firm performance increases
during the recession than boom time. A related study by Jenter and Kanaan (2008)
tests the first prediction that the increased probability of CEO dismissals in
recessions should be concentrated on underperforming CEOs. Underperformance
in bad times reveals low CEO skills or a lack of the specific skills required to
succeed in bad times, and thus leads to the CEO’s dismissal. They test this idea by
estimating whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to peer performance depends
on whether a CEO underperforms or outperforms the benchmark. The result shows
that the marginal effects of peer performance on CEO dismissals separately for
underperformers and for out performers. They conclude that the peer performance
effect on CEO turnovers is driven by boards being much more likely to remove
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underperforming (but not outperforming) CEOs in bad times than in good times.
The closely related second prediction is that CEO turnover should be more
sensitive to firm specific performance in recessions than in booms. They found that
the effect of firm-specific performance on CEO turnover is smallest when industry
performance over the prior two years was high, and is largest when industry
performance was low.
Similar evidence that CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm
performance also appears in Australia (Suchard et al (2001)), Belgium (Renneboog
(2000)), Britain (Conyon (1998), Conyon and Florou( 2002)), and China (Conyon
and He (2008), Kato, and Long (2006)).
3. Sample, Data, and Methodology
3.1. Sample
Our sample originates from the S&P 500 firms covering the 2004-2011
periods. The firms with CEO turnovers are then identified by consulting with the
ExecuComp database. The resulting lists of CEO turnovers are then cross-checked
with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) to
confirm the dismissal announcement date as well as to ascertain the stated reason
for dismissal.
We classify all CEO turnovers into two categories: voluntary CEO turnovers
and involuntary CEO turnovers based on the reasons given by the firm. A CEO
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change is considered as a voluntary CEO turnover when it occurs due to planned
succession, retirement, voluntary resignation, stepping down, bad health, death, or
interim replacement. An involuntary turnover occurs when a CEO is fired, forced
to resign, or resigned due to scandal, accounting conflicts, and poor performance.
This yields a final sample of 421 CEO turnovers, including 405 voluntary CEO
turnovers and 16 involuntary CEO turnovers. 3.8% of the CEO turnovers are
classified as involuntary. The annual average forced CEO turnover (Forced CEO
turnover/Number of years) is 47.5% which is consistent with what reported in
Taylor (2010) (48.85%, a sample of firms over 1970-2007) and that in Chen (2012)
(41.4%, a sample of firms over 1995-2009). Out of the total 405 voluntary
turnovers, only 58 are strictly voluntary in the sense these turnovers are not related
to retirement, death, illness etc. I refer to these cases as truly voluntary turnovers.
3.2 Main Model
Consistent with my hypothesis, given below is the general model I test in
this paper. Controlling for other variables that might be relevant,
LENGTH = f (quality of corporate governance) where the LENGTH is measured
by the time it takes to fire a CEO after the first poor performance of the firm.
3.2.1. Length Defined: Incidental Truncation
The length it takes to replace CEOs after the initial sign of poor firm
performance (LENGTH) is measured by the difference between the time the firm
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shows the first sign of poor firm performance and the time when the CEO is
dismissed. The length is observed only for a subset of population ---the firms that
actually remove their CEOs consequent upon their first poor performance; it
cannot be observed for firms that choose not to fire their CEOs. This common form
of sample selection is called incidental truncation.
The usual approach to incidental truncation is to use the Heckit method
based on the work of Heckman (1976). First, we need to add an explicit selection
equation to the population model:
y = xβ + u, E (u x ) = 0.............(1)
s = 1[ zγ + v ≥ 0] .....................................(2)

Where, s=1 if we observe y (the length), and zero otherwise. We assume that
elements of x and z are always observed, we write x β = β 0 + β1 x1 + ... + β k xk and
zγ = γ 0 + γ 1 z1 + ... + γ m zm

The equation of primary interest is (1), and we could estimate β by OLS given a
random sample. The selection equation (2), depends on observed variables, zh , and
an unobserved error, v. A standard assumption, which we will make, is that z is
exogenous in (1): E (u x, z ) = 0
In fact, for the following proposed methods to work well, we will require that x be
a strict subset of z: any x j is also an element of z, and we have some elements of z
that are not also in x.
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The error term v in the sample selection equation is assumed to be
independent of z (and therefore x), we also assume that v has a standard normal
distribution. We can easily see that correlation between u and v generally causes a
sample selection problem. To see why, assume that (u,v) is independent of z. Then
taking the expectation of (1), conditional on z and v, and using the fact that x is a
subset of z gives E ( y z, v ) = x β + E (u z, v ) = x β + E (u v ),
Where E (u z, v ) = E (u v ) because (u,v) is independent of z. Now if u and v are
jointly normal (with zero mean), then E (u v ) = pv for some parameter ρ . Therefore,
E ( y z, v ) = xβ + ρ v

We do not observe v, but we can use this equation to compute E ( y z, s ) and then
specialize this to s=1. We now have:
E ( y z, s ) = xβ + ρ E ( y z, s )

Because s and v are related by (2), and v has a standard normal distribution, we can
show that E (v z, s ) is simply the inverse Mills ratio, λ ( zγ ) then s=1. This leads to
the important equation
E ( y z , s = 1) = x β + ρλ ( zγ )....................(3)

Equation (3) shows that the expected value of y, given z and observability of y, is
equal to x β , plus an additional term that depends on the inverse Mills ratio
evaluated at zγ . Remember, we hope to estimate β . This equation shows that we
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can do so using only the selected sample, provided we include the term λ ( zγ ) as
additional regressor.
If ρ = 0, λ ( zγ ) does not appear, and OLS of y on x using selected sample
consistently estimates β . Otherwise, we have effectively omitted a variable, λ ( zγ ) ,
which is generally correlated with x. When does ρ = 0 ? The answer is when u and v
are uncorrelated. Because γ is unknown, we cannot evaluate λ ( ziγ ) for each i.
However, from the assumptions we have made, s given z follows a probit model:
P( s = 1 z ) = Φ ( zγ )...........................(4)

Therefore, we can estimate γ by probit of si on zi using the entire sample. In a
second step, we estimate β . The procedure can be summarized as follows:
(i) Using all n observation, estimate a probit model of si on zi and obtain the
⌢

estimate γ h . Compute the inverse Mills ratio, λi = λ ( ziγ ) for each i. (Actually,
⌢

⌢

we only need these for the i with si = 1 .)
(ii) Using the selected sample, that is, the observations for which si = 1 (say,
⌢
⌢
n1 of them), run the regression of yi on xi , λi . The β j are consistent and

approximately normally distributed
⌢

We use t-statistic from the second step (ii) on λi to test the hypothesis H 0 : ρ = 0 .
Under H 0 , there is no sample selection problem.
3.2.2. Measures of firm performance
12

Following Smith (1990), Denis & Denis (1995), Yermack (1996), Allgood
and Farrell (2000), Anderson and Reed (2003), Dezso (2005), We employ three
measures of firm performance---Return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE)
and market-to-book ratio (M/B). ROA is defined as EBITDA over the book value
of total assets, ROE is defined as EBITDA over total equity at the start of the year,
and M/B as book value of assets plus market value of common stock less the book
value of common equity divided by book value of total assets. Since operating
income does not include taxes, dividends, or interest income received, or dividends
paid to stockholders, it is argued to be a robust measure of changes in the operating
performance of an organization and less vulnerable to managerial manipulation
(Smith, 1990; Denis & Denis, 1995). In order to control for industry effects, we
control for industry performance while measuring the firm performance. In so
doing, we subtract the industry performance from the firm performance. The
industry average is based on all firms that have the same 4-digit SIC code as the
sample firm.
In addition to the three measures of performance discussed above, we also
use a fourth measure based on previous studies, including Yermack (1996) and
Farrell (2002). This measure calculates surprise earnings and abnormal returns by
examining performance changes from two years prior to turnover to two years after
the turnover. Surprise earnings are defined as the difference between the actual

13

return and forecasted return, while abnormal returns are calculated by two
methods---actual returns minus market returns, and actual returns minus the return
predicted by the market model.
3.2.3. Initial sign of poor firm performance
Several studies have documented that the average CEO tenure is between 6
and 7 years. For instance, Kaplan and Minton (2008) place such tenure to less than
seven years based on a sample of large U.S during the 1992-2005 period and
Coates and Kraakman (2010) find that the average tenure is 6.91 years (sample of
S&P 500 from 1992-2004). Therefore, in this paper we will focus on a 7 year
period prior to the CEO firing to identify the initial sign of poor firm performance.
Initial sign is defined as the first time the firm performance is inferior to the
industry performance.
3.2.4. Factors affecting the efficacy of the corporate governance system
3.2.4.1. Board Structure
We focus on only three aspects of the board structure that have been shown to have
implications for the effectiveness of the board. They are a) percentage of outside
directors, b) board size, and c) CEO-Chairman duality.
Percentage of outside directors on the board: The board is the shareholders’
first line of defense against incompetent management. And, the board becomes
more independent and therefore, more effective, with increasing representation by
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outside directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors, who tend to
be major decision-makers at other organizations, have incentives to signal to the
labor market that they are experts in decision control by acting in shareholder
interests. Outside directors increase the value of their human capital by
strengthening their reputations as decision control experts. Inside directors, on the
other hand, are more apt to be concerned about maintaining their current position
in the firm. Existing literature supports this argument. For instance, Weisbach
(1988) reports that outside directors (directors who neither work for the
corporation nor have extensive dealings with the company as outside directors)
represent shareholder interests better than inside directors (directors who are fulltime employees of the corporation). Weisbach reports that firms with outsider
dominated boards (all firms in which at least 60% of the board are outsiders are
designated outsider-dominated firms) are significantly more likely than firms with
insider dominated boards (all firms in which outsiders make up no more than 40%
of the directors are considered insider-dominated firms) to remove the CEO
following poor firm performance. He adds that outsider-dominated boards tend to
add to firm value through their CEO changes and the addition to firm value is
largest when the change is preceded by poor performance.
Extending Weisbach’s (1988) line of reasoning, Borokhovich et al (1996)
argue that the decision to fire a CEO after bad firm performance does not benefit
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shareholders unless the board also appoints a more capable successor. They show
that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and
the likelihood that an outsider is appointed CEO. In other words, outside directors
are also more likely to fire a CEO with an executive from outside the firm since
new CEOs from outside the firm appear to be perceived as more likely to alter firm
policies in a way that benefits shareholders. Huson et al (2000) also support this
point. They argue that successors from outside the firm are more willing to break
with the failed policies of their predecessors. Based on the preceding discussion,
we expect that there will be a negative relation between the length to fire a poorperforming CEO and the percentage of outsider directors on board.
Board size: The empirical work predominantly suggests that smaller board
size is more effective than larger board size because the problems with
coordination and processing overwhelm the advantages gained from having more
people to draw on (Steiner (1971) and Hackman (1990)). Lipton and Lorch (1992)
suggest that large boards can be less effective than small boards, and recommend
limiting the size to seven or eight people in the board. Jensen (1993) reports that
when a board gets beyond seven or eight members it is less likely to function
effectively and easier to be controlled by the CEO. Yermack (1996) finds that a
firm with smaller board is more likely to remove its CEO following a bad firm
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performance.1 To be consistent with Yermack (1996) and Dezso (2005), I measure
board size as the number of members of the board of directors as of the annual
meeting date during each fiscal year, and then take the natural log of each..
CEO-Chairman Duality: When CEO also serves as the Board Chairman, the
role of the board in monitoring CEO actions is compromised, jeopardizing board
independence (e.g., Palvia (2011), Goyal and Park (2002), Adams, Almerda, and
Ferreira (2005)). Other studies take the view that duality entrenches CEOs and
adversely affects the firm performance (e.g., Dalton and Rechner, 1991)).2 We
expect to find a positive relation between duality and the length of time it takes to
fire the CEO.
3.2.4.2. Ownership Structure
CEO ownership: If a CEO is also a significant owner of the company, the
probability of firing himself/herself after the poor firm performance dwindles due
to conflict of interest (Denis et al (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry
(2000), Coates and Kraakman (2007), and Coates and Kraakman (2010)), Thus, a
1

Although the overwhelming majority supports the greater efficiency of the smaller board size,
this opinion is not unanimous. For example, Faleye (2003) do not find significant differences in
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance based on the board size. Faleye suggests that
both small and large boards are likely to terminate the CEO when faced with significant and
consistent deterioration in performance.
2
Not all scholars view duality as having negative implications for the firm. These researchers
argue that duality is merely a “natural result of succession process” and thus has no systematic
impact on firm performance (e.g., Brickley, Jeffrey, and Gregg (1997), Adams et al (2005), and
Chen (2012)). Zajac and Westphal (1996) argue that the power of a board is decided by its
tenure relative to that of the CEO. It is reasonable to assume that duality alone will not
significantly increase the power of a successor CEO over the board since the former is new to the
CEO position.
17

negative relation is expected between CEO ownership and CEO turnover.
Consequently, the length it takes to fire the CEO gets higher as the ownership of
the CEO in the firm increases. We calculate CEO percentage shareholdings by
dividing the number of CEO shares by total shares outstanding.
Insider ownership has an important

Insider (managerial) ownership:

influence on internal monitoring mechanisms. Empirical work (for example, Ofek
(1993), Denis and Denis (1994), Mikkelson and Partch (1996)) reports a negative
relation between the managerial ownership and the rate of CEO turnover,
suggesting that higher managerial ownership reduces the effectiveness of internal
monitoring. To provide further evidence on whether equity managerial ownership
affects internal monitoring mechanisms, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (DDS) (1997)
allow the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance to vary with the
levels of various managerial ownerships of 1,394 Value Line Investment Survey
firms over the period 1985-1988. Following Morck et al (1988), DDS classify
managerial ownership into three categories: less than or equal to 5%, between 5%
and 25%, and greater than 25%. Their results suggest that managerial ownership
has a significant impact on the sensitivity of turnover to performance. The
probability of turnover is negatively related to performance when managerial
ownership is less than 5% and significantly less sensitive to performance when the
managerial ownership is between 5% and 25%. Their overall findings are
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consistent with the hypothesis that higher ownership partially insulates managers
from internal monitoring mechanisms. We expect a positive relation between the
degree of managerial ownership and the length taken to dismiss CEOs. We use
ownership by all officers and directors as a proxy for managerial ownership.
Managerial ownership is calculated by the number of all officers and directors’
shares divide by total shares outstanding.
Block ownership by outsiders: DDS (1997) find that the negative relation
between turnover and performance is significantly stronger in firms with higher
outside block ownership.3 We expect that higher ownership by outside blockholders would lead to more effective corporate governance measures such as the
time elapsed between poor performance and dismissal of the CEO would be
shorter4. Consistent with Denis et al (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry
(2000)), we calculate outside block holder ownership by dividing the number of
outside block holder shares by total shares outstanding.
3.2.4.3. Directors Compensation

3

A block-holder is defined as the one who owns at least 5% of the firm’s shares and is not
related to the top management team (or do not own shares over which managers have some
voting authority).
4
However, the effect of outside block holders on the sensitivity of turnover to performance
might not be as the sensitivity with respect to managerial ownership. The reason is that different
outside block holders have different incentives to monitor managers. For example, Brickley et al
(1988) argue that certain institutional investors with potential business relationships with a firm
are more likely to align themselves with incumbent managers. Other institutions, lacking the
potential for a business relationship are less likely to have their actions affected by the conflict of
interest.
19

Since the early 1980’s, the proportion of outside directors receiving stock
options and stock grants has increased dramatically. In a 1989 Conference Board
Survey of 909 firms, Bacon (1989) finds that six percent of firms granted stock to
outside directors and 14 percent granted stock options. In the 1997 Conference
Board survey, the percentage of firms paying stock-based compensation to outside
directors had increased to 84 percent (Worrell (1997)). In addition, Pearl Meyer
and Partners (1996) report that the stock-based compensation paid to outside
directors at the 200 largest industrial and service corporations increased from 2
percent to 22 percent of directors’ total pay between 1985 and 1995.
Stock or option grants are likely to complement the managerial labor market
in providing outside directors with incentive to represent stockholder interest.
Some researchers argue that firms can increase the monitoring of management by
providing outside directors with a financial stake in the performance of the firm.
For instance, firms can encourage outside directors to “think like shareholders” by
compensating directors with incentive-based compensation. Perry (2000) reports
that the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor stock performance is
significantly greater when directors of independent boards (outside dominated
board5) are given incentive-based compensations. Following Perry (2000), we
include a dummy equal to one when directors of independent boards receive

5

The percentage of outsiders on the board is at least 60% .
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incentive compensation, it is zero otherwise. We expect the relation between
incentivized directors and the length of time it takes to fire the CEO to be negative.
3.2.5. Control variables
3.2.5.1. Number of subsidiaries
Firm size has been used as a control variable in many studies related to CEO
turnover. These studies show that firm size affects the relationship between firm
performance and CEO turnover (see, for example, Warner et al (1988), Denis,
Denis and Sarin (1997), Perry (2000), Huson et al (2001), and Dezso (2005)).
These studies, in general, agree that smaller firms are more likely than larger firms
to remove CEOs after poor firm performance. For example, Denis, Denis and Sarin
(1997) document that CEO turnover following bad firm performance is
significantly less likely in larger firms. In addition, (Parrino, 1997) finds that larger
firms are more likely to appoint an insider to replace an outgoing CEO. A potential
explanation for this empirical regularity is that smaller firms tend to have fewer
senior managers that are qualified to replace the outgoing CEO and an outside
candidate is more likely to be effective in a smaller, less complex organization.
However, in this paper, we use number of subsidiaries as one of the control
variables because it is more difficult to appraise the CEO’s contribution to the
firm’s performance in a complex organization (many subsidiaries). We would
expect the length (elapsed between poor performance and CEO firing) would be
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positively related to the number of subsidiaries. Number of subsidiaries is defined
as the number of 4 digit subsidiaries for each firm.
3.2.5.2. CEO tenure
CEO tenure has been considered as a potential factor that influences the likelihood
of turnover after poor firm performance in several studies (for example, Denis et
al. (1997), Parrino (1997), Allgood and Farrell (2000), and Goyal and Park
(2002)). While Denis et al. (1997) find no significant relation between CEO tenure
and CEO turnover after poor firm performance, Parrino (1997), Allgood and
Farrell (2000), and Goyal and Park (2002) report a positive and significant
association. In this paper, we expect the relation between tenure and the length of
being fired to be negative and measure this variable in terms of the number of
years a CEO has held the position.
3.2.6. Expanded equation
LogOfLEGTH = y = β 0 + β1 * ( PercentageOfOusideDirectors ) + β 2 * ( B oardSize ) +
+ β 3 * ( ManagerialOwnership ) + β 4 * (CEOOwnership ) +
+ β 5 * (OutsideBlockholderOwnership ) + β 6 * D1 +
+ β 7 * ( LogOfTheumberOfSubsidiaries ) + β 8 * ( LogofCEOTenure ) +
+ β 9 * ( LogofCEOTenure ) 2 + β10 * D2 + ε ..........................................................(5)

where
•LENGTH: is the time it takes to get CEOs replaced after the initial sign
of poor firm performance
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•Percentage of outside directors: number of outside directors divided by
the number of directors of the board
•Board size: log of number of members of the board of directors
•Managerial Ownership: number of all officers and directors shares
divided by total shares outstanding (%)
•CEO Ownership: number of CEO shares divided by total shares
outstanding (%)
•Outside Block holder Ownership: number of outside block holder shares
divided by total shares outstanding (%)
•D1: is dummy variable that is 1 if the company uses incentive
compensation for outside directors
•D2: is dummy variable that is 1 if a CEO is also a chairman
Number of subsidiaries, CEO tenure and D2: are control variables
•CEO tenure: is measured by the number of quarters a chief executive
had been in office
•Number of subsidiaries: is measured by the number of 4 digit
subsidiaries for each firm
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3.3. Data Sources
Ownership and compensation is collect from ExecuComp database and Compact
Disclosure. Board size and board composition data can be collected from
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Investors Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) and Compact Disclosure. Stock returns data are obtained from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting data from the Compustat
database. We also require each company to have other data available besides CEO
turnover between 1997 and 2011.
3.4. Econometric model
To be consistent with Huson et al. (2004) and Chen (2012), we use a two-step
model developed in Heckman (1979)6 to deal with sample selection issue because
some firms in the sample do not have involuntary CEO turnover until the end of
the period 2004-2011. In the first step, we use probit model (6) to estimate the
probability of removing CEOs and the inverse Mill’s ratio ( λˆi ):
P = α0 + α1 * quality _ of _ corporate _ governance +
+α 2 * ( LogOfTheumberOfSubsidiaries ) +
+α 3 * ( LogofCEOTenure) + α 4 * ( LogofCEOTenure)2 +

+α5 * D2 + u........................................................(6)

where P is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a forced CEO
turnover in firms, and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in previous sections.
7

See Heckman (1979) for details in section 3.2.1
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In the second step, we estimate OLS model (7) with the λˆi added as an
independent variable. The λˆi is supposed to capture the omitted variables in OLS
regressions where data are censored (e.g., Heckman, 1979).
LogOfLength = π 0 + π 1 * quality _ of _ corporate _ governance + π 2 * λˆi + v........................(7)

4. Results
4.1. Summary statistics
Table 1 shows a median company board has 10 directors, of which 80.02%
is outside directors. While the percentage of independent director (the number of
independent directors/board size) is high, the median percentage of inside directors
(the number of inside directors on a board/board size) is only 19.05%. This board
size is very close to recent years. The average size of S&P 500 boards is 10.8
directors in 2008 and 2007, and 10.7 directors in 20057. A median CEO has served
on the board for 5.02 years. A median CEO age is 54.56 years which is close to
CEO average age reported in Wall Street Journal. All officers and directors, CEO,
outside block holders own 6.1%, 5.16%, 8.89%, respectively.

8

Source: www.spencerstuart.com
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Table 2 reports sample frequencies of reasons for CEO turnovers over the 20042011 periods. Of all the 421 CEO turnovers identified in this study, 405 are
classified as voluntary turnovers and 16 are classified as forced turnovers. The
average annual rate (the annual number of turnovers/the number of firms) is
10.53% similar to that reported in Wall Street Journal over the recent period.
However, it is higher than the average annual bank CEO turnover rate 7.04%
documented in Chen (2012) (a sample of firm in banking industry during 19952009). The reason is because S&P 500 firms are more likely replace CEO than
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firms in the banking industry. Table 2 shows that 19 turnovers due to planned
succession, 164 turnovers due to retirement, 64 turnovers due to voluntary
resignation, 126 turnovers due to stepping down, 6 turnovers due to bad health, 6
turnovers due to death, 20 turnovers due to interim CEO replacement, 11 turnovers
due to being forcing out, 2 turnovers comes from resignation due to scandal, 2
turnovers comes from resignation due to accounting conflicts, and 1 turnovers
comes from termination due to CEO poor performance. The percentage of internal
CEO turnover replacement (72.21%) is higher than the percentage of external CEO
turnover replacement (27.79%). In other words, firms are more likely replace their
CEO internally. During these eight years, we identified 421 cases of CEO
turnover; of these, 405 (96.2%) are voluntary and 16 (3.8%) are forced turnovers.
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4.2. Market reaction to CEO turnover announcements
In this section, we examine firm long-run abnormal stock performance around
CEO turnovers with a sample of 421 CEO turnovers as described in previous
section. Table 3 reports average abnormal stock returns over six window periods
around the announcement [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], [+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], [+Q1,
+Q7]. Following Chen (2012), stock returns are measured by a four factor model
that includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP value-weighted
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market return and risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between portfolios of
small and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between portfolios of
high and low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor. The market model
parameters are estimated with data over the 24-month period seven quarters before
the turnover announcement quarter.

Table 3 suggests that firms with involuntary turnovers have sharper decrease in
abnormal return compare with firms which do not. Furthermore, table 3 indicates
that firms showing a sharp decrease in pre-turnover abnormal stock performance
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during the [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], and [-Q1] are more likely to remove CEO with
outside successors.
4.3. Firm performance changes around CEO turnovers
4.3.1. Changes in return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)
To be consistent with Chen (2012), we examine firm performance over the
two periods around the CEO turnover announcement [-Q7, -Q1] and [+Q1, +Q7].
Firm performance can be measured by: unadjusted and industry-adjusted return on
assets (ROA), unadjusted and industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE), and
market-to-book ratio. In this section, we compare changes in return on assets
(ROA = operating income/the book value of total assets) and return on equity
(ROE= EBITDA/the book value of total assets) across turnover types (forced vs.
voluntary) and replacement type (internal vs. external) in two post-turnover
periods. Changes in unadjusted ROA and industry-adjusted ROA are significantly
higher in the case of forced turnover than in the case of voluntary turnovers
(columns 1 and 2). It implies that purpose of changing in forced turnover is to
improve firm performance. Table 4 also indicates that the poorer the firm
performance, the higher the external CEO replacement (column 5 and column 4).
For instance, both firms A and B have CEO replacement as result of poor firm
performance, however firm B performs poorer than firm A. Therefore, firm B is
more likely to replace a CEO with an outsider. In addition, outside directors tend to
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outperform inside directors in the pre-turnover period, although not significantly.
Unadjusted ROE and Industry-adjusted ROE in table 4 tell the same story.

4.3.2. Changes in market-to-book ratio
We report the percentage average changes in market-to-book ratio of 421
turnovers for S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2011 in the table 5. Again,
market-to-book ratio is defined as book vale of assets plus market value of
common stock less the book value of common equity over book vale of total
assets. Table 5 implies that forced turnovers and external replacement are both
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preceded by a significant decrease in market-to-book ratio (column 2 and 5). Table
5 further suggests that with experiencing a significant decline in market-to-book
ratio, firms tend to remove their CEOs and select an outside successor (column 5).

4.4. Length vs. Quality of Corporate Governance
We report results for probit model (6) and model (7) in column 1 and
column 2 of Table 6. Table 6 indicates that the coefficients on percentage of
outside directors are negative ((-0.03114) for model (6) and (-0.02145) for model
(7), and significant (at 1% and 5% in the model (6) and (7), respectively); it
suggests that there is a shorter length to remove CEOs after the initial sign of poor
firm performance for firms with higher proportion of outside directors. This result
is consistent with Weisbach (1988), Borokhovich et al (1996), Huson (2000),
Maury (2006), Kato and Long (2006), Conyon and He (2008)). Outside directors
are more likely motivated in removing CEOs by poor performance compared with
inside directors.
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Table 6 further reports coefficient on board size is positive and significant at
5% in model (7). According to Lipton and Lorch (1992)), Jensen (1993) and
Yermack (1996), smaller board sizes are more effective especially in the case of
firing CEOs after poor performance. They argue that keeping boards small can
help improve their performance since when firms have large boards they are less
likely to function effectively.
Coefficients on managerial ownership in both models are positive and
significant (significant at 5% in the model (6) and 10% in the model (7)). It implies
that there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the length to
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get CEOs removed after the initial sign of poor firm performance. This suggests
that higher equity managerial ownership partially insulates managers from internal
monitoring mechanisms, which is also reported in DDS (1997) who find that
higher levels of holdings by top managers decrease the sensitivity of turnover to
performance, implying that higher CEO ownership will increase the length it takes
to get the CEOs removed. Coefficients on CEO ownership in both models (6) and
(7) are positive and significant at 5% and 10%, respectively.
There is a negative relationship between outside block holder ownership and
the length to dismiss a CEO. The coefficient on outside block holder ownership is
negative (-0.00231) and significant at 5% for model (6). Large equity stakes in the
company provide block-holders an increased incentive to monitor management,
resulting in higher performance-turnover sensitivities. Therefore, firms with higher
outside block ownership are more likely to quickly terminate poor-performing
CEOs. In the models (6) and (7), we also investigate the impact of incentive
compensation for outside directors on the length on removing poor performing
CEO. The results show that the length is significantly shorter when directors of
independent boards (outside dominated board) receive incentive compensation
than when they do not. Firms can increase the monitoring of the management team
by providing directors with a financial stake in the performance of the firm.
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We also investigate the interaction between firm performance and incentive
compensation for outside directors. Perry (2000) documents that the likelihood of
CEO turnover following poor stock return performance is significantly greater
when outside directors of the board receive incentive compensation than when they
do not. Our result supports Perry (2000)8. Number of subsidiaries is one of many
factors that affect the length of removing CEOs. Table 6 yields the expected result
regarding the relationship between the number of subsidiaries9 and the length in
removing the CEO. We find that in the sense that smaller firms tend to remove
CEOs following poor firm performance faster than small firms, which is consistent
with DDS (1997). The coefficient of log of number of subsidiaries is positive
0.00528 and significant at 5% in model (6).
Several papers report a positive and significant relationship between CEO
tenure and CEO turnover (Parrino (1997), Allgood and Farrell (2000), and Goyal
and Park (2002)). This implies a negative relation between the tenure and the
length of dismissal. Consistent with this finding, we find a negative association
between CEO tenure and the length. As regards CEO/chairman duality, we find a
positive association between this factor and the length. This result is consistent
9

Our result persists when we use ROE and abnormal returns as alternative measurements of firm
performance.
10
We also use CEO gender and CEO age as control variables. The results tell us the same story
that firm with better quality of internal corporate governance in place are quicker to replace their
CEO following the poor firm performance. However, CEO gender does not have any effect on
the length it takes to replace CEO following the poor firm performance, which is consistent with
Hays et al (2011)
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with that found in Palvia (2011), Goyal and Park (2002), and Adams, Almerda, and
Ferreira (2005). The finding suggests that CEO/chairman duality jeopardizes board
independence by increasing CEO power over the board. Coefficient on λˆi is
positive 0.00713 and significant at 5%. A simple test of selection bias is available
from regression (7). We can use the usual t statistics on λˆi as a test of H 0 :π 2= 0 .
Under H0, there is no sample selection problem. The coefficient on λˆi has a very
small t statistics (0.1175), so we fail to reject H 0 :π 2= 0 , there is no evidence of a
sample selection problem in estimating the length of removing CEOs.
4.5. Robustness test
There are a few firms in our sample in which the first poor performance is
followed by a second one. In this section, we examine whether the length to
terminate a CEO is shortened in firms where there are two successive poor
performances. The main regression:

LogOfLEGTH = γ 0 + γ 1 * ( PercentageOfOutsideDirectors ) + γ 2 * ( BoardSize) +
+ γ 3 * ( ManagerialOwnership) + γ 4 * (CEOOwnership ) +
+ γ 5 * (OutsideBlockholderOwnership ) + γ 6 * D1 +
+ γ 7 * ( LogOfTheumberOfSubsidiaries ) + γ 8 * ( LogOfCEOTenure) +
+ γ 9 * ( LogOfCEOTenure) 2 + γ 10 * D2 + γ 11 * D3 + υ .....................................................................(8)

D3 is a binary variable, equals 1 if firm performance is inferior to the industry

performance once, 0 otherwise. The other variables are defined as in the section
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3.2.6. Using the same procedure Heckman two-step, overall finding suggests that
the better the quality of internal corporate governance, the shorter is the time taken
by the firm to get its poor performing CEO removed. In addition, firms
experiencing poor performance more than once are more likely to remove their
CEO faster.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of internal corporate governance on
the length it takes to terminate CEOs after the initial sign of poor firm
performance. Our sample consists of voluntary and involuntary CEO turnovers that
occurred in the S&P 500 firm during 2004-2011. We investigate changes in firm
performance proxied by three factors: ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on
equity), and market-to-book ratio (M/B) by CEO turnover types.
The main result of this paper is that firms with more effective internal
corporate governance are likely to be quicker to terminate CEOs after the initial
sign of poor firm performance. This result is consistent with the findings in the
previous literature (for instance Brickley et al. (1988); Weisbach (1988); Morck et
al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Denis, Denis and Sarin (1995);
Borokhovich et al (1996); Yermack (1996); Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997); Huson
(2000) ; Perry (2000); Maury (2006); Kato and Long (2006); Conyon and He
(2008)). Specifically, firms with higher proportion of outside directors, smaller
board size, greater outside block-holder ownership, and higher incentive-based
compensation for directors are associated with quicker dismissal of poorperforming CEOs. These three aspects of corporate governance have been found in
empirical research to promote effectiveness of the governance system. On the other
hand, firms with higher managerial as well as CEO ownership and in which CEO
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is also the Chairman of the board are likely to take a longer time to fire the CEO.
These features often lead to conflict of interests and partially insulate managers
from internal monitoring mechanisms.
The above results prevail even after controlling for three factors that are not
directly related to internal governance mechanisms----- number of subsidiaries,
CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO age. Smaller firms and firms in which the CEO has
been in the same position for a longer time are likely to be faster in firing their
CEOs.
In addition, by dividing CEO turnover into two categories: voluntary vs.
involuntary CEO turnover based on the reason given by the firm to the news
media, and internal replacement vs. external replacement, we find that selection of
outside directors is likely motivated by poor performance. Moreover, outside
directors tend to outperform inside directors in the pre-turnover period. We also
test market reaction to CEO turnover announcement. The result suggests that
involuntary turnovers have sharper decrease in abnormal return compared to
voluntary turnovers.
It might be argued that this paper suffers from selection bias. To address this
issue, we performed d a simple test of selection bias. The result shows that there is
no evidence of a sample selection problem in estimating the length of removing
CEOs. In summary, the more effective the internal corporate governance, the
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shorter the length it takes to get CEO removed following the initial sign of bad
firm performance.
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ESSAY 2: DOES PERFORMACE OF THE FORMER FIRM AFFECT A
CEO’S ABILITY TO FID A IDETICAL POSITIO WITH A
SUBSEQUET FIRM?

Abstract:
Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500
firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance
on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I
find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being
hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the
CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the
presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender.
The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in
performance of their new employers.

Key words: CEO characteristics, Firm performance, Quality of CEO
CEO turnover, Job potentials
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1. Introduction
One of the primary roles of a corporate board is to hire a chief executive
officer (CEO) with superior abilities. An obvious question facing the board is:
What makes a CEO tick? To put it differently, are there some reliable factors that
can predict how successful a CEO would be in this position?

However, the

identification and measurement of CEO ability is a difficult, imprecise and
expensive process as evidenced by the growing “executive search” industry, and
the considerable resources that are expended in the CEO search process.
Many researchers have broached this issue in an attempt to aid the board in
its CEO-hiring process and identified some objective and relatively easily
measurable characteristics that might affect a potential CEO’s ability and, as a
result, strengthen or weaken the chances of him/her being hired as CEO. Four of
the prominent characteristics are education, tenure, age, and gender of the
applicant.

Bhagat, Bolton, and Subramanian (2001) find no evidence to support

their proposition that the higher the level of education, all else the same, the
superior is the CEO’s ability to perform. Miller and Shamie (2001) find that it is
common for managers’ performance to decline later (after 15 years in office) in the
careers due perhaps to their declining propensity to new experimentation. A similar
view is shared by Katz (1982), Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988),
Sonnenfeld (1988); Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992), Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and
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Fredrickson (1993), Miller (1990), (1991), (1994), Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1995) and Walsh (1995). Not all scholars associate longer experience of a CEO
with declining firm performance. For example, Gabarro (1987); and Hambrick and
Fukutomi (1991) argue that increased knowledge of the organization and superior
ability to compete actually allow CEOs with longer tenures to perform better.
Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984), Salancik and Pfeffer (1985), Boeker (1992);
and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995) provide an alternative argument as to why
CEOs with long experience might perform better. They argue that poor performing
CEOs are weeded out early and, consequently, mostly stronger performers survive.
According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), career concerns of CEOs change with
age: at younger age, they are not too concerned about their career and are willing
to take more costly unobservable actions, as the age advances, the CEO’s career
concerns increase, and finally, concerns fall again as the CEO approaches
retirement. Thus, the age of the person applying for the CEO position might
influence the board’s decision to hire him/her. According to Blease, Elkinawy and
Stater (2009), female executives are more likely than male executives to resign
their positions voluntarily but are less likely than men to depart voluntarily as firm
size increases or board size decreases. Consequently, the gender too might affect a
candidate’s chance of being hired as CEO.
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Fee and Hadlock (2003) propose a model of managerial ability that predicts
a positive relationship between prior firm performance and the likelihood that a
manager moves to a superior position at another firm. Their evidence is broadly
consistent with the predictions of the managerial ability model that prior firm
performance is used by the labor market as a signal of managerial ability- a key
assumption in many of the career-concerns models.
Following Fee and Hadlock (2003), I posit in this essay that performance
record of a CEO with a prior firm is likely to play a dominant role in this person
being hired in a similar position with a subsequent firm. Specifically, I examine the
subsequent employment history of persons who voluntarily resign CEO positions
from the S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I hypothesize that CEOs
who performed better during their tenure with preceding firms are likely to more
quickly find similar jobs with subsequent firms. I define CEO turnover as
voluntary when a CEO leaves the firm voluntarily and equivalent position as CEO,
directors of the board, chairman of the board, or founder of a new company. My
findings are largely consistent with the main hypothesis: better previous firm
performance leads to a CEO finding a similar job with a similar company quicker
(within six months). I also find evidence that these CEOs continue to out-perform
their slower (between six and 24 months) counterparts in their new place of
employment.
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature
review. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the methodology and
provides measure of each variable. Section 5 discusses results and Section 6
presents conclusions.
2. Literature review
Previous literature, to our understanding, has not examined how CEO
characteristics and prior firm performance affect the probability of a person who
leaves his/her firm voluntarily as a CEO finding an equivalent job at another firm.
Here I summarize the findings of papers that have examined the characteristics of a
person who is likely to be hired as a CEO. The following characteristics have often
cited in the literature as the desired attribute of CEO of a public held company:
education, tenure, gender and age.
Bhagat et al (2010) documents that CEO education appears to play an important
role in the hiring of CEOs. CEO education influences CEO ability in three ways.
First, education provides CEO knowledge to utilize all the technique and concepts
into the real world. Second, higher education can help CEOs solve and overcome
challenges quickly and intelligently. Finally, the social networks acquired in
college and graduate school can be quite helpful professionally in the future. On
the other hand, they do not find a significant systematic relationship between CEO
education and long-term firm performance. It implies that CEO education does not
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affect the long-term performance of firms. However, CEO education is just one of
the determinants of CEO ability.
Miller and Shamie (2001) assert that CEOs’ abilities to make changes may vary
across their tenures. They document that executive tenure may be associated with
both good and poor performance—but at different stages of an executive’s career.
They find that it is common for managers’ performance to decline later in their
careers. Although some might argue for CEO term limits to counter this tendency,
they found that decline occurred quite late, usually after 15 years in office.
Moreover, this decline was associated with a fall in experimentation, a trend that
might be combated by greater awareness of the problem. Other papers argue that
CEO knowledge of their organization and its ability to compete helps them to
contribute to better performance (Gabarro (1987); Hambrick and Fukutomi
(1991)). Long experience is also said to be associated with success because those
who perform very poorly tend to be dismissed—mostly the strong survive (Boeker
(1992); Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1995); Salancik and Pfeffer (1985); Wagner,
Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984)). Other research, however, shows that executives who
stay on the job too long become ‘stale in the saddle’—overly committed to the
status and thus less effective ((Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995); Fredrickson,
Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988); Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992); Hambrick et al
(1993); Katz (1982); Miller (1990), (1991), (1994); Sonnenfeld (1988); Walsh

50

(1995)). Overall findings suggest that top executives have ability to change firm
performance based on their tenure. Therefore, tenure may be an important factor to
be considered during hiring process.
CEO gender and CEO age may have some influence on hiring decision.
According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), younger CEO are willing to take more
risky actions because of lower career concerns, such as leaving their job
voluntarily without having a guaranteed job somewhere else. The CEO’s career
concern sensitivity should increase as the CEO ages (CEO experience). On the
other hand, there will be fewer career concerns as the CEO is near retirement.
Therefore, CEO’s career concerns will be high at a certain time of CEOs’ age.
Another related study by Blease, Elkinawy and Stater (2009) suggests that female
executives are more likely than male executives to depart their positions
voluntarily, and women are less likely than men to depart voluntarily as firm size
increases or board size decreases. Therefore, age and gender may affect a person’s
potential in job market for CEOs.
Previous firm performance is also a signal of managerial ability to find a job
elsewhere after leaving a firm voluntarily. Fee and Hadlock (2003) constructs a
model of managerial ability that predicts a positive relationship between prior firm
performance and the likelihood that a manager moves to a superior position at
another firm, and no apparent relationship between prior firm performance and the
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likelihood of downward moves to new employers. These findings suggest that
CEO characteristics and previous firm performance might play an important role in
the hiring of CEOs.
3. Sample, Methodology, Variables and Data
3.1.

Sample:

My sample includes the S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I collect
the information about CEO turnovers for these firms from ExecuComp database.
All CEO turnovers are cross-checked with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Wall
Street Journal Index (WSJI) or both to get exact date of the announcement of the
change as well as the reason given by the company for the change. I classify all
CEO turnovers into two categories: voluntary CEO turnovers and involuntary CEO
turnovers based on the reasons given by the firm to the news media. A CEO
change is considered as a voluntary CEO turnover when it occurs due to planned
succession, retirement, voluntary resignation, stepping down, bad health, death, or
interim replacement. An involuntary turnover occurs when a CEO is fired, forced
to resign, or resigned due to scandal, accounting conflicts, and poor performance.
This yields a final sample of 356 CEO turnovers--341 voluntary and 15
involuntary. Out of the total 341 voluntary turnovers, only 51 are strictly voluntary
in the sense these turnovers are not related to retirement, death, illness etc. I do not
find any reference to ten of the 51 CEOs subsequent to their resignation from the
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previous job and, therefore, use the remaining 41 observations in my sample.
Twenty two CEOs find an equivalent job within 6 months, and 19 CEOs find an
equivalent job within 6 to 24 months.
3.2.

Model:
My main model is as follows:
The length of time to find a similar job = f (prior firm performance
and control variables).

The length of time is a binary variable that equals one if a CEO gets a job at
another company less than 6 months after she or he leaves the firm voluntarily and
equals zero otherwise. Following Fee and Hadlock (2003), since potential
employers will look back over a fairly long period in assessing a CEO's potential
for their firm, I choose to measure firm performance over the five-year period that
precedes the executive's departure. Return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE)
and market-to-book ratio (M/B) are my primary performance measures. Follow
Smith (1990); Smith and Watts (1992); Denis & Denis (1995), Yermack (1996);
Shin and Stulz (1998); Allgood and Farrell (2000); Palia (2000); Anderson and
Reed (2003), Dezso (2005); Gottesman and Morey (2006) I define return on assets
(ROA) as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)
over the book value of total assets, return on equity (ROE) as earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over total equity at the start
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of the year, market-to-book ratio (M/B) as book value of assets plus market value
of common stock less the book value of common equity. Since operating income
does not include taxes, dividends, or interest income received, nor any dividends
paid to stockholders, it is argued to be less subjected to managerial manipulation
and, therefore, a robust measure of changes in the operating performance of an
organization (Smith, 1990; Denis & Denis, 1995).
3.2.1. Control variables
My control variables are education, tenure, age and gender of the CEO along
with the industry demand and overall employment scenario in the economy.
Definition of each variable follows.
CEO education: Since my sample is small, proxy for CEO education is
binary variable that takes 1 if a CEO has a master degree or a higher degree, and 0
otherwise.
CEO tenure: To be consistent with Denis et al. (1997); Parrino (1997);
Allgood and Farrell (2000); Goyal and Park (2002)); Bhagat et al (2010), I define
tenure as the length of time a CEO has served in this capacity prior to joining the
new firm.
CEO age: Following Bhagat et al (2010), I define age as the age the CEO attains
at the end of the fiscal year in which he/she resigned from the previous company.
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CEO gender: This is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when the CEO is
a male and 0 when the CEO is a female.
3.2.2. Other Control Variables
Firm Size: Following Bhagat et al (2010), I use firm size as a control
variable. Firm size is measured as the natural log of book value of total assets for
the fiscal year.
2umber of subsidiaries: I use it as one of the control variables because it is
more difficult to appraise the CEO’s contribution to the firm’s performance in a
complex organization (many subsidiaries). Number of subsidiaries is defined as the
number of 4 digit subsidiaries for each firm.
Unemployment Rate: The other control variable that I use is the prevailing
unemployment rate in the economy surrounding the time period when the
voluntary turnover occur for each CEO.
Industry Unemployment Rate: I use the industry unemployment rate to
control for the industry effect.
I use Probit model to investigate the impact of CEO characteristics (CEO
education, CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO gender), unemployment rates and prior
firm performance on CEOs’ potentials of being hired on an equivalent job for the
case of voluntary CEO turnover:
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Pr(1, 0) = β 0 + β1 * CEOEducation + β 2 * CEOTenure + β 3 * CEOAge +
+ β 4 * CEOGender + β 5 * UnemploymentRate + β 6 * Pr iorFirmPerformance +

+ β 7 * (CEOAge * CEOTenure) + β 8 * (CEOGender * FirmSize)
+ β 9 * Logofassets + β 9 * LogofumberOfSubsidiaries +
+ β10 * ( LogofCEOtenure) 2 + β10 * IndustryUnemploymentRate + ε ...............(1)

where
Pr = Length of time to find a similar position with another company: it takes
on a value of 1 when a CEO obtains an equivalent job within 6 months after
resigning and zero when the length of time is between over 6 months but
equal to or below 24 months.
Performance of the Prior Company= measured by M/B, ROA, ROE.
CEO education: is binary variable that equals 1 if a CEO owns at least a
master degree or higher degree, and 0 otherwise
CEO tenure: is measured by the number of years that the CEO has been the
CEO (years) (log of CEO tenure)
CEO age: is the age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year (years): log of
age;
CEO gender: is binary variable that equals one if a CEO is female, 0
otherwise
Unemployment rate (%) when a CEO resigns from the previous company.
Firm size: is measured as the natural log of book value of total assets for the
fiscal year
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Number of subsidiaries: is defined as the number of 4 digit subsidiaries for
each firm.
Industry Unemployment Rate (%): the unemployment rate of the industry to
which a sample firm belongs.
Following Gottesman and Morey (2006), I collect information include the
CEO tenure, age, gender, and educational background for each CEO from the
Register Executives publication provided by Standard and Poor’s NetAdvantage
database for S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. CEO tenure, CEO age
and CEO gender information are also cross-checked from Execucomp, and website
www.spencerstuart.com. The educational background information provides the
name of the educational institution where each CEO received their undergraduate
and graduate degrees, and whether the graduate degree was an MBA, law degree,
or other graduate degree. To be consistent with Bhagat (2010), if the CEO obtains
a degree during his/her tenure as CEO, I do not distinguish this as there are very
few CEOs in this situation. Using Execucomp database, as well as the Compustat
and CRSP databases, I gather annual operational performance measures such as
total assets, total sales, M/B, ROA, ROE. Total sales are the net annual sales as
reported by the company. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over the book value of total
assets, return on equity (ROE) is measured by earnings before interest, tax,
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depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), divided total equity at the start of the
year, market-to-book ratio (M/B) is calculated as book vale of assets plus market
value of common stock less the book value of common equity over book value of
total assets. Occupational unemployment rates were collected from the Current
Population

Survey’s

monthly estimates,

at

http://ferret.bls.census.gov/cgi-

bin/ferret, consistent with other recent work (Trevor (2001) and Kammeyer (2005))
4. Results
4.1. Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the CEOs and
the firms in which they are employed for the full sample firm experiencing CEO
turnovers and the sub sample firms experiencing CEO voluntary turnovers. I report
summary statistics for the full sample firms experiencing CEO turnovers (Panel A)
as well as firms experiencing CEO voluntary turnovers (Panel B). These variables
include CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, firm’s total assets, return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book ratio (M/B) and stock industry
sales. Table 1 show a median CEO age is 54.43 years for the whole sample and
55.19 for the sub sample which are very close to the recent years10. A median CEO
has served on the board for 5 years. The means indicate that 3.2% of the.

2

The median age for S&P 500 CEOs is 55 in 2007, and 54 in 2008

(Source www.spencerstuart.com)
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observations are female CEO for the full sample, and 3.1% for sub sample.
Medians on return on assets (ROA) are 11.34% for the sub sample compare to
11.34% for the full sample. Median on return on equity (ROE) for the full sample
is 13.25% while it is 13.12% for the sub sample. Market-to-book ratios have a
median of 2.2 and 2.1 for the full sample and the sub sample, respectively. Firm
size has a median of 82,376 (millions) for the full sample and 83,372 for the sub
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sample. A median on industry sales is 75,266 (millions) for the full sample and
74,877 for the sub sample
Table 2 presents the reasons for CEO turnovers from 2004-2009. During
these six years, I identified 356 cases of CEO turnover; of these, 341 (95.79%) are
voluntary and 15 (4.21%) are forced turnovers. Percentage of voluntary turnovers
increases from 91.04% in 2004 to 100% in 2011, while that of forced turnovers
decreases from 8.96% in 2004 to 0% in 2011.

4.2. Market reaction to CEO turnover announcements
In this section, I examine current firm long-run abnormal stock performance
around CEO turnovers with a sample of 41 CEO turnovers including 22 CEOs
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finding a job within 6 months (group 1) and 19 CEOs finding a job within 6 to 24
months (group 2). Following Chen (2012), stock returns are measured by a four
factor model that includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP
value-weighted market return and risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between
portfolios of small and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between
portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor. Table
3 reports average abnormal stock returns over six window periods around the
announcement [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], [+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], [+Q1, +Q7]. The
market model parameters are estimated with data over the 24-month period seven
quarters before the turnover announcement quarter. (Insert table 3). Table 3
suggests that firms in group 2 have sharper decrease in abnormal return compare
with firms in group 1 in pre-turnover, especially in the period [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q1, Q4],. The abnormal returns for group 1 are -15.34% and -12.12%, significant at
10% and 5% in the period [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], respectively. The abnormal
return for group 2 is -17.89%, significant at 5% in the period [-Q7, -Q1]; however
it is not significant in the period [-Q4, -Q1]. Their abnormal stock performance
improves in the post-turnover period for both groups, which is consistent with
Denis and Denis (1995), Huson et al (2004)). The abnormal return for group 1 is
3.13%, significant at 1% in the period [+Q1, +Q4].The abnormal return for group 2
is 2.78%, significant at 10% [+Q1, +Q4]. However, the abnormal returns for group
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1 are significant higher then abnormal returns for group 2. The abnormal returns
for both groups are not significant in the periods [-Q1] and [+Q1]. It indicates that
the market does not react immediately a quarter before and a quarter after to the
CEO turnover announcement.

4.3. Previous firm performance and time it takes to find an equivalent job
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As
Table 4 shows, there is a positive association between prior firm performance and
CEO’s potentials of getting hired (coefficient = 0.03721, significant at 1% in
column 1, coefficient = 0.02562, significant at 5% in column 2, coefficient =
0.00778, significant at 10% in column 3). Higher returns on assets (ROA), higher

63

return on equity (ROE) and higher market-to-book ratio (M/B) increase the
probability of CEOs finding an equivalent job, consistent with the findings of
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004). My findings therefore support the notion
that CEOs are likely to more quickly find the employment under conditions of
strong previous firm performance11.
Column 1, 2, and 3 in the table 4 shows that coefficients on CEO education
are 0.03190, 0.02211 and 0.00157 which are positive and significant at 5%, 5%
and 10%, respectively. It suggests that CEOs with master degree or higher degree
can find an equivalent job faster than those who do not. In other word, the higher
the CEO education, the faster of being hired. This result is consistent with the
previous hypothesis. There is a positive association between CEO’s experience
(CEO tenure) and CEO’s potentials of getting a job (the coefficients are 0.00238 in
column 1 and 0.00469 in column 2, significant at 5% and 10%). It indicates that
the more experience CEO have, the faster they can be hired on an equivalent job.
However, there is no effect of CEO age and CEO gender on their potentials of
finding a job since the coefficient is not significant. In addition, I also investigate
the interaction between CEO gender and firm size. However, the coefficients are
not significant. The chance of CEOs getting a job depends on the market condition.
3

I found the similar result by running this regression:

( LogOfTheLengthOfTimeToFindAJob) = β 0 + β1 * CEOEducation + β 2 * CEOTenure + β 3 * CEOAge +
+ β 4 * CEOGender + β 5 *UnemploymentRate + β 6 * Pr iorFirmPerformance +
+ β 7 * (CEOAge * CEOTenure) + β8 * (CEOGender * FirmSize)
+ β 9 * Logofassets + β 9 * LogofumberOfSubsidiaries +
+ β10 * ( LogofCEOtenure)2 + β10 * IndustryUnemploymentRate + ε
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The result tells that when the job market is down (higher unemployment rates), the
chance of CEOs being hired is less likely that when the job market is up (lower
unemployment rates).
There is no interaction between CEO tenure and CEO age to CEO’s
potential of being hired since the coefficient is not significant. Coefficient on firm
size are 0.01773, significant at 10% in column 1, 0.00936 significant at 5% in
column 2 , 0.01556 significant at 10% in column 3, which indicates that firm size
has a positive effect on CEO’s potentials of being hired, which suggests that CEOs
in larger firms are more mobile in the market. Coefficients on industry
unemployment rate are not significant; therefore there is no industry effect on
CEOs’ potentials of getting an equivalent job somewhere else.

Table 5 compares the performance of previous firms for the two groups –the group
that finds job within 6 months and the group that takes longer. It shows that on
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average, firms associated with group 1 significantly outperform the firms
associated with group 2.
4.4. Relative Performance of the new firms associated with two groups

Table 6 shows that the performance of new firms improves with the hire of new
CEOs. However, the improvement rendered by the first group (the CEOs who find
jobs within 6 months) is higher than that of the second group.
Table 7 demonstrates that CEO characteristics, in general, have relatively
low or no impact on the performance of new firms, with the exception of CEOtenure which has statistically significant positive impact on performance of new
firms.
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6. Conclusions.
By using the Probit model I investigate the impact of CEO characteristics
and previous firm performance on their potentials of being hired on an equivalent
job in case of S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I found that the better
the quality of CEOs, the faster they can find an equivalent job somewhere else, and
the better the previous firm performance, the higher chance of them getting an
equivalent job. Specifically, a CEO with a master degree or a higher degree can get
a job faster than a CEO who does not. The more CEO’s experience, the more
potentials of them being hired on an equivalent job. Older CEOs with higher
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experience are more likely being hired faster. Female CEOs are less likely to get a
job as fast as male CEOs due to the fact that male CEOs are more mobile and
active in the job market than female CEOs. I also found that there are abnormal
returns around CEO turnover announcement, which indicates that the market is
very sensitive and reacts to the CEO turnover announcement immediately.
In addition, I test the relationship between CEO characteristics and current
firm performance. There is a positive association between CEO tenure and current
firm performance in the case of using ROA (return on assets) as proxy for firm
performance. The rest of results show that there is no evidence of the relationship
between CEO education, CEO age, CEO gender and current firm performance.
The reason might be that the proxies of CEO characteristics are not correct or I
have not controlled appropriately for variables. This suggests that future research
can look at this by using appropriate proxies for CEO characteristics and control
for the right variables.
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